A Hardware Security Module (HSM) is any hardware that you can use for crypto operations without revealing the crypto keys. Specifically I’m referring to the Yubikey NEO and TPM chips, but it should apply to other kinds of special hardware that does crypto operations. I’ll refer to this hardware as the “device” as the general term, below.
When describing the Yubikey NEO I’m specifically referring to its public key crypto features that I’ve previously blogged about, that enable using Yubikey NEO for GPG and SSH, not its OTP generating features.
To generate keys for these devices you have two options. Either you tell the device to generate a key using a built in random number generator, or generate the key yourself and “import” it to the device. In either case you end up with some handle to the key, so that you command the device to do a crypto operation using the key with a given handle.
This “handle” is often the key itself, but encrypted with a key that has never existed outside the device, and never will. For TPMs they are encrypted (wrapped) with the SRK key. The SRK is always generated inside the TPM chip.
TPM chips and Yubikey NEO both allow for importing and internal generation of keys. As does YubiHSM, which is a device that provides some other crypto primitives more geared at the server side.
Internal key generation for normal Yubikey OTP mode doesn’t any sense, since the security model with these OTPs are a shared secret between the Yubikey and the authentication server. They key can’t be extracted after being imported, but it has to exist outside the Yubikey too. So it by definition has to exist in at least two places, and at least temporarily has to exist in RAM.
So, which is it? Generate on device or import a key?
If the answer hadn’t been “it depends”, then this blog post would have been much shorter. They both have pros and cons.
Arguments for generating on the device
The key has never been in RAM. Even if your computer was already hacked when you programmed the device, the keys are safe and don’t have to be recalled.
The key has never been on disk. There is no chance that part of the key generator was swapped out to disk while it had sensitive data in RAM. I list this point separately to stress that as soon as the key has ever existed on disk, it should be treated as being copied. While Gutmann hasn’t been relevant for many years for modern hard drives, and a single overwrite on a spinning disk is probably safe against even the best adversaries, it’s getting harder and harder to actually overwrite anything. With newer filesystems with journals and copy-on-write you can’t overwrite data through the file system anymore. And even if you succeed on the file system layer sectors may be remapped on spinning platter disks, and wear leveling makes it pretty much impossible to overwrite all data on SSDs. It’s easier, safer, and possibly cheaper (due to write cycle limits), to just destroy the drive and buy a new one.
Cold boot attacks are prevented. If you generate on the CPU and in RAM someone with physical access could powercycle the machine and read out the contents of the memory. This is an unlikely attack, I’ll admit.
Arguments for generating on CPU and importing into device
Keys can be backed up before importing. You’ll note that this is pretty much an attack against yourself. You can GPG the key to an encrypted file that can only be decrypted by the private key you store in your physically guarded safe. This point doesn’t matter if your use case makes it cheap and easy to just regenerate the keys.
The big benefit is that the random number generator is under your control. The entropy for generating the key can be taken from the device, RDRAND in your CPU, timings between keyboard pressings, network packets arriving, etc.. Since you can use (and /dev/random uses) many different sources, any one of them being bad is not a catastrophy. A hardware device can only use itself, and a deliberate or accidental flaw is much more serious.
Like I mentioned earlier no matter how you generate your individual
keys with a TPM chip, they are encrypted with the SRK key, and the
“handles” are opaque blobs encrypted with this key. If the random
number generator in the device is flawed, backdoored, or otherwise
compromised, then an attacker can exploit this to decrypt your blobs,
and thus get to your keys. If the TPM chip random number generator is
bad then your key blobs can be broken. But it’s not a complete
break. As long as the keys themselves are of good quality then the
attack only works if you have access to the blobs. You are still in a
better situation than if you just had standard
Short answer: generate the key on the device.
Motivation: I respect differing opinions (and have laid out arguments against my recommendation above), and may change my mind in the future. The reason I recommend generating the key on the device is that this is the only way in which you can say “this key has never existed, and will never exist, outside the device” (barring you doing something stupid like generate the key as a migratable key, something that’s possible with TPM chips at least, and is even default and the only possible with opencryptoki).
Bear in mind:
- Do not generate migratable keys. Jeez!
- Feed some random data to the hardware before generating the
My alternative recommendation
Neither way is bad, really. So if you prefer to generate the key outside the device, I recommend:
- If possible, do not generate migratable keys. (not possible with TPM 1.2, but will be with TPM 2.0)
/dev/urandomor any homegrown thing.
- Generate the key only after the machine has been up for a while, and has had a chance to gather entropy.
- Never store the key on disk, even temporarily. Use
/dev/shmif your key generator has to use files.
- Generate the key and import into the device from the same program, don’t pass it along to an importer.
- Overwrite the key in memory when you’re done importing it into the device. Keep in RAM for as short a time as possible
- Don’t generate keys in a long-running daemon. Let the OS clean up after key generator.
Comments, suggestions, corrections and opinions welcome.